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Abstract: 
The large scale extraction of natural gas from shale rock layers in North America using hydraulic 
fracturing, or “fracking”, has prompted geologists, economists and politicians in various parts of 
the world to ask whether there are new reserves of this precious resource to be found under their 
soils. It has also raised a host of questions about the potential environmental impacts of 
extracting it. Drawing on research on both sides of the Atlantic, this paper assesses the most 
pressing issues for research and policy makers related to shale gas extraction. The paper first 
provides a survey of environmental and economic issues related to shale gas. It then turns to a 
case study of Poland, whose policy makers have been among the most fervent proponents of 
shale gas development in the European Union. We examine the status of shale gas extraction in 
that country and what the barriers are to overcome before commercial extraction can in fact take 
place, if at all. 
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Article: 
1. Introduction 
This paper examines the shifting center of gravity of the debate over fracking and shale gas 
development from North America to Europe and assesses the complex mix of market, 
environmental, and geopolitical considerations that set the tone, and likely the outcome, of this 
debate in Europe. No European country has a history of commercial development of shale gas, 
and it is still far from certain that a single cubic meter of gas will be commercially produced. The 
reasons for this uncertainty lie partly in geologic and geographic realities about the distribution 
of shale resources, but there are also significant economic, political, and environmental obstacles 
that would need to be overcome for the emergence of a commercially viable shale gas industry in 
Europe akin to what has developed in North America over the past decade. Bans on hydraulic 
fracturing are already in place in France, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, and the Netherlands and the 
German federal state of Nordrhein–Westfalen have imposed moratoria pending further research. 
In Poland, where government enthusiasm for shale extraction is greatest and public opposition 
least vocal, as of writing only about twenty wells have been drilled, with a handful of private 
companies researching cores to establish what amount of natural gas can eventually be 
commercially extracted. The US Energy Information Administration estimates that technically 
recoverable shale gas reserves in Poland are roughly 187 trillion cubic feet (tcf), or roughly 5300 
billion cubic meters (bcm), though the Polish Geological Institute’s estimate is far smaller as 
noted later in the paper. Other substantial basins in Europe are in France and Scandinavia (US 
Energy Information Administration, 2011). 
Because it is at the center of the emerging European discussions over shale gas, the paper uses 
the case of Poland to assess the emerging issues surrounding shale gas in Europe. The article is 
based on interviews in Warsaw with senior Polish government officials and natural gas industry 
representatives, in Brussels with European Union officials, as well as field site visits in northern 
Poland (see Table 1 for a list of interviews). The paper also draws extensively on published 
reports, scientific literature, and government documents related to shale gas and hydraulic 
fracturing, which is currently the favored technology for extracting shale gas. The structure of 
the paper is as follows. First, an overview of key policy considerations is provided. This includes 
an analysis of how the “shale gas revolution” in North America and its ripple effects on natural 
gas markets beyond North America, and an examination of the environmental science of shale 
gas and hydraulic fracturing in light of existing policies in Poland and the EU. Second, the 
regulatory, infrastructural, and geopolitical context of energy in and its implications for shale gas 
development in Poland is described. Third, and by way of conclusion, the prospects for shale gas 
development in Poland are assessed in light of the available evidence. 
Table 1. Overview of interviews conducted. 
Interview with When? Where? 
Private US gas company November, 2011 Pennsylvania, US 
Environmental protection agency November, 2011 Washington, DC, 
US 
European commission, DG energy, DG environment and 
DG climate 
January, 2012 and 
May, 2012 
Brussels, Belgium 
European Parliament, representatives of ITRE committee 
and ENVI committee 
January, 2012 Brussels, Belgium 
Private gas company January, 2012 Gdansk, Poland 
Ministry of Environment, Ministry of Economic Affairs, January, 2012 Warsaw, Poland 
Interview with When? Where? 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
 
2. Key policy considerations concerning shale gas 
In North America, the shale gas genie is out of the bottle. Barring some sensational finding on 
the environmental impacts of hydraulic fracturing (“fracking”), such as extensive groundwater 
contamination, shale gas will likely remain a growing part of the energy landscape in North 
America (Boersma and Johnson, 2012). The debate will continue in scientific and policy 
communities, localities, and the media, about the potential impacts of shale gas extraction on 
climate, a fledgling renewables industry, groundwater and surface water quality, structural 
geology, etc., and there are legitimate concerns in each of these realms that shale gas could have 
detrimental effects. In certain jurisdictions overlying recoverable deposits, these concerns may 
inhibit the development of shale gas resources. However, the overall political and business 
cultures in both the United States and Canada have historically valued hydrocarbon development 
in spite of environmental costs, domestic energy supplies instead of imports, and property 
owners’ rights to exploit subsurface mineral rights versus the collective’s wishes to prevent such 
exploitation. Some have argued that the regulatory framework governing natural gas 
infrastructure development, transportation services, marketing and minerals rights have been 
crucial elements in the development of shale gas (Medlock, 2012). Whatever the exact causes 
may be, they are unlikely to change anytime soon. 
 
2.1. Market and economic impacts 
Over the past decade shale gas exploitation has boomed in the United States. In 2010, production 
amounted to 5 tcf (141.5 bcm) and projections are this number will almost triple by 2035 (US 
Energy Information Administration, 2012). However, the limitations of these projections must be 
considered. 
 
First, new technical and/or geological insights have to be taken into consideration. The 2012 
Annual Energy Outlook downgrades estimates of technically recoverable resources, largely due 
to a decrease in the estimate for the Marcellus shale from 410 tcf to 141 tcf (1160 bcm to 400 
bcm). When accounting for land use patterns, regulations and policies, much of the shale gas that 
is likely underground is not in fact recoverable (Blohm et al., 2012). Given this context, it is 
worth noting here that roughly a decade ago many in industry, government, and academia, had 
not foreseen the development the US gas industry has experienced. In other words, predicting 
future developments in shale gas is exceedingly difficult. 
 
Second, economic conditions of the gas market can change. Abundant production within the 
United States has caused natural gas wellhead prices to plummet after July 2008 (US Energy 
Information Administration, 2011). Increasingly there are reports of delayed investments in 
drilling of new wells for exactly this reason. This development has prompted some to support the 
reintroduction of a wellhead price-floor, which was abolished in 1989 with the Wellhead 
Decontrol Act (Weijermars, 2011). However, it appears that the market shall correct the existing 
mismatch between supply and demand, with for instance BP reporting a write-off of $2.1 billion 
on shale gas acreage because of lower natural gas prices.1 
 
Despite existing uncertainties, the impacts of the US shale gas boom are substantial. 
Domestically, wellhead prices for natural gas are expected to remain below $5 per thousand 
cubic feet at least to 2023. Relatively cheap gas in turn is expected to trigger investments in gas-
fired power plants, resulting in an assumed rise of the share of natural gas in the electricity 
generation portfolio to 27% in 2035 and in some scenario studies an even more substantial rise 
up to 2050 (Paltsev et al., 2011). More broadly speaking, the future of natural gas depends on a 
complex set of factors, such as adoption of natural gas for transportation, future climate policies, 
renewable energy policies or the lack thereof, and geopolitical considerations (Myers Jaffe and 
O’Sullivan, 2012) 
 
It appears that the effects of US shale gas production on European markets have been indirect to 
date and there are currently no signs that this will change in the near future. Liquefied natural gas 
(LNG) from Qatar, other parts of the Middle East and Eastern Siberia intended for terminals in 
North America is now finding its way to both European and Asian markets. Furthermore 
increased usage of gas-fired power plants in the US has made coal cheap and available, resulting 
in an incline of coal-fired electricity generation in Europe (Rühl, 2012). LNG is changing the 
dynamics of global gas markets and European gas prices on spot markets have been significantly 
lower than oil-indexed gas during recent years. It is therefore expected that the EU will continue 
to move slowly away from oil-indexation as long-term contracts are re-negotiated and new 
contracts negotiated that take into account market developments (Pearson et al., 2012). 
 
Significant shale gas resources have been reported in the European Union (Leteurtrois et al., 
2011, Polish Geological Institute, 2012 and US Energy Information Administration, 2011). Yet 
given the absence of experience with shale gas extraction in most parts of the world and given 
the number of related uncertainties, reserve estimates should be treated with ‘considerable 
caution’ (Pearson et al., 2012). In stark contrast to the US, actual shale gas extraction is still in 
the embryonic phase. A replication of the US shale gas revolution has been questioned, with 
reference to less favorable geological conditions, the absence of tax breaks, lack of a well-
developed onshore service industry and the possible lack of public support due to the absence of 
local financial benefits (Stevens, 2010). Some predict that the best case shale gas production 
scenario for the EU is replacement of declining conventional production and having import 
dependence not exceed 60% (Pearson et al., 2012). 
 
In Poland a handful of wells have been drilled and companies are examing cores to establish the 
quality of gas and at what cost it can be extracted. In the United Kingdom shale gas producers 
got the green light from government to extract shale gas after a pause due to further research on 
human induced seismic activity. We shall elaborate on this later in the paper. Other countries are 
awaiting further research such as the Netherlands and Germany, while France, Bulgaria, and the 
Czech Republic have put outright bans in place to extract shale gas using hydraulic fracturing. 
The reasons for this are not always clear. French officials justified their ban on the fact that 
hydraulic fracturing technologies bring too many uncertainties at this stage, while the Czech 
Republic argues that its current regulatory framework is not sufficient to safeguard shale gas 
extraction in an environmentally viable fashion. The ban in Bulgaria was put in place in January 
2012, but after realizing that the wording of the ban also would have prevented conventional gas 
production using low-pressure hydraulic fracturing, the ban was partially lifted in June 2012. 
 
2.2. Environmental impacts 
Market realities will be an important factor influencing whether and where shale gas resources 
are developed in Europe, just as they have in North America. But the potential environmental 
costs and risks associated with shale gas and hydraulic fracturing could end up determining 
whether shale gas development is stopped in its tracks in the European Union. Within the context 
of the multilevel governance structures of the EU, the responsibility for developing policies on 
energy supply and production are largely still the purview of individual member states. However, 
the governance of environmental and air quality is one realm in which many core competencies 
now reside in Brussels, and any industrial activity – such as hydraulic fracturing – that has 
potential impacts on water or air quality will be subject to the environmental impact rules set by 
the EU. In the case of North America, environmental regulators and the scientific community 
alike were caught off-guard by the shale gas revolution, and the interviews we conducted in 
Brussels in the European Parliament and in the directorates for energy (DG Energy) and 
environment (DG Environment) suggest a similar game of catch-up being played. The major 
regulatory difference between the North America and the EU involves the precautionary 
principle, which is enshrined in the Lisbon Treaty and sets the tone for the implementation of 
any new technology such as hydraulic fracturing. This section of the paper provides an overview 
of the major environmental questions that currently surround shale gas and fracking. 
 
2.2.1. Carbon footprint and fugitive methane 
Fugitive methane emissions, i.e., the gas that is released during the production process, has 
potential implications for both the atmosphere as well as groundwater. This section addresses the 
science on the climate impacts of methane and fuel switching from coal, oil, nuclear, to a 
newfound abundance of natural gas. Methane as a potential groundwater pollutant will be 
addressed in a subsequent section. 
 
Fugitive methane emissions represent the gas that is leaked during the complete fuel cycle, i.e., 
from extraction to burning. Methane is more than 20 times more potent (in terms of its “global 
warming potential” or “radiative forcing”) than CO2 as a GHG, but has a much shorter half-life 
in the atmosphere than CO2 (Alvarez et al., 2012).2 Methane from all anthropogenic sources 
(e.g., agriculture, landfills, wastewater treatment, natural gas production) represents about 10% 
of all GHG emissions in the US, and natural gas systems constituted the largest anthropogenic 
source of methane emissions. Methane emissions from natural gas production have increased by 
25.8 teragrams (or million metric tons) of CO2 equivalent (Tg CO2 Eq.), or 13.6%, since 1990 
(US Environmental Protection Agency (2012b)). Most of the fugitive methane emissions are 
“process related,” and a majority (58%) come during field production (e.g., from the wells 
themselves, gathering pipelines, gas treatment facilities such as dehydrators) (ibid.). In short, 
there are leaks in the production of both conventional and unconventional gas, and a large part of 
the debate is over how large as a percentage of overall production those leaks are. 
 
In a widely cited paper, Howarth et al. (2011) estimated that fugitive methane emissions from the 
life cycle of a shale gas well were substantially higher (between 3.6% and 7.9%) than for 
conventional gas well (between 1.7% and 6.0%). Other scientists have questioned the data used 
in that paper (Cathles et al., 2011). Some have argued that there are technical fixes available that 
could substantially reduce the amount of fugitive methane and carbon (Wang et al., 2011). 
However, these fixes focus primarily on preproduction emissions, while life cycle estimates are 
mostly dominated by the combustion emissions of the gas (Jiang et al., 2011). Thus, uncertainties 
whether shale gas is potentially a viable bridging fuel to a low carbon economy and what can in 
fact be done about methane emissions during the life cycle. Some concluded that large scale 
usage of natural gas is not the way forward in the transition to low-carbon electricity, and 
suggest a combination of conservation, wind, solar, nuclear energy and possible carbon capture 
and storage instead (Myhrvold and Caldeira, 2012). Ironically, some observers have noted that 
carbon sequestration sites could be restricted due to large scale shale gas extraction from shale 
rock layers. In short, shale gas extraction involves the fracturing of shale rock layers in order to 
increase its permeability to let the natural gas flow up into the well and as such hydraulic 
fracturing is in conflict with using these rock formations as a barrier to CO2 migration (Elliot 
and Celia, 2012). 
 
A recent study by Alvarez et al. (2012) assessed the warming potentials of different fuel 
switching scenarios, using what they describe as “technology warming potentials” (TWPs). They 
found that at current leakage rates from natural gas production and delivery infrastructure mean 
that, for example, a switch from petroleum-fuel powered to natural gas powered vehicles would 
have net negative climate impacts, especially in the short term, while switching from coal-fired 
to natural gas-fired electricity generation would have climate benefits. They added the major 
caveat that their modeling assumes a 3.2% overall leakage rate for the US, which is in actuality 
likely to be higher with better data from actual well sites. The 3.2% average is also likely a lower 
leakage than for shale produced methane, as cited above. The bottom line is that without 
substantial improvements in leakage rates, it is difficult to make a convincing argument that the 
life cycle climate impacts of shale gas are better than for other hydrocarbon fuel sources. 
 
In the absence of a coherent climate policy, it is not clear what regulatory mechanism would be 
applied in North America to ensure that such technical fixes be required. One area in which 
federal regulations have been adopted is air quality. In April 2012 the federal EPA used its 
authority under the Clean Air Act to regulate emissions from drilling activity. From 2015 onward 
gas companies will be required to conduct hydraulic fracturing according to rules on Reduced 
Emissions Completions or ‘green completions’, e.g., the application of capture technology to 
avoid damaging gases, such as volatile organic compounds or methane to come into the air. Until 
2015 companies are required to flare these emissions (US Environmental Protection Agency, 
2012b). Further research is needed to identify what share of the wells in the US in fact fall under 
these regulations, as several exemptions apply. For example, EPA has estimated that “green 
completions” are not feasible in 87% of the natural gas wells fractured in coal bed methane 
formations. 
 
2.2.2. Surface and groundwater contamination and other water related concerns 
Another concern linked to shale gas development is the contamination of drinking water, by 
some labeled as the most contentious of issues that have arisen over shale gas development 
(Groat and Grimshaw, 2012). So far, two cases of contaminated drinking water have been 
reported that were likely to be directly linked to shale gas exploitation. In Pavillion, Wyoming, 
EPA began investigating private water wells three years ago, following concerns that were 
expressed by local residents. After constructing two deep monitoring wells to sample water, EPA 
found that ground water contained compounds likely associated with natural gas production. The 
draft report was published in December 2011 and will be open to comments until October 2012 
(US Environmental Protection Agency, 2011a). Another individual case stems from Dimock, 
Pennsylvania, where in November 2011, the EPA issued that four domestic water wells 
contained inorganic hazardous substances at levels that presented a public health concern. The 
action memorandum that was released in January 2012 reports the presence of several substances 
that are known to be common constituents in fracking fluids, i.e., Barium, DEHP, Glycol 
compounds, Manganese, Arsenic, Phenol and Sodium (US Environmental Protection Agency, 
2012a). The first results of a broad study conducted by that same EPA on the potential impacts of 
hydraulic fracturing on drinking water resources are not expected before late 2012, with final 
results pending until 2014 (US Environmental Protection Agency, 2011b). Therefore up till now, 
it proves to be difficult to draw more general conclusions about drinking water contamination 
and links to hydraulic fracturing and related activities. 
 
Meanwhile, what has widely become known as the “Halliburton loophole” continues to ensure 
that comprehensive federal regulation of hydraulic fracturing as it relates to potential 
groundwater contamination remains elusive. In short, an insertion in the Energy Policy Act of 
2005 amended the Safe Water Drinking Act and exempted hydraulic fracturing as a technology 
from the Underground Injection Control (UIC) program, except when diesel fuel was used in the 
process, making it impossible for EPA to regulate potential groundwater contamination caused 
by fracking3. 
 
In addition to the risk of fracking fluids leaking during the production process, leaking natural 
gas itself can potentially contaminate groundwater supplies. One study focusing on the Marcellus 
and Utica shale formations in Pennsylvania found systematic evidence for methane 
contamination of shallow drinking-water systems in at least three areas that was linked to shale 
gas extraction. Methane concentrations were detected in 85% of the wells under study, but 
concentrations were substantially higher closer to natural gas wells. This study found no 
evidence for contamination of drinking water with fracking fluids (Osborn et al., 2011). A large 
study at the University of Texas reported that there was no evidence of chemicals in aquifers as a 
result of fracking operations. The greatest environmental risk associated with fracking, according 
to this study, is not from groundwater contamination, but rather from surface contamination 
caused by spillage of undiluted chemicals (Groat and Grimshaw, 2012). Overall the issue of 
drinking water contamination remains controversial, with no clear empirical outcome at this 
stage implying a causal link between fracking itself and contamination of water wells. There are, 
however, a number of reports of methane leakage from improperly sealed well bores.4 
 
Water issues linked to shale gas are not limited to contamination, but also concern the 
availability of the resource. According to EPA estimates the water needed to fracture a horizontal 
well is typically between 4 and 6 million gallons per well, depending on depth, horizontal 
distance and number of times the well is fractured (US Environmental Protection Agency, 2010). 
In July 2011, the Texas Water Development Board estimated that the shale gas industry used 
about 12 billion gallons of water per year in Texas, a number that was expected to grow up to 40 
billion gallons per year in 2030 (Nicot et al., 2011). A study focusing on the three major shale 
gas plays in Texas to quantify the net water usage for shale gas production, found that roughly 
10% of annual water use in Dallas is destined for the shale gas industry. For the whole state of 
Texas, water usage for shale gas is under 1% of total withdrawal, however local impacts vary 
with availability of water and competing demands (Nicot and Scanlon, 2012). 
 
Another environmental concern linked to shale gas and water is what to do with wastewater, 
once it has been injected in the well together with sand and chemicals. The most quoted options 
are reinjection in the well, discharge to surface water after treatment or application to land 
surfaces. Data from 2011 from the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection 
suggest that about half the wastewater was treated; about one third was recycled to be used in 
other hydraulic fracturing operations, while less than one tenth was injected into disposal wells 
(Hammer and vanBriesen, 2012). Wastewater handling has been reported as a key problem for 
environmental opposition in several cases (Rahm, 2011). Some studies have suggested that 
federal and state regulations have not kept pace with the shale gas industry and should be 
strengthened to reduce risks of hydraulic fracturing for current regulatory frameworks are 
‘inadequate’ to do so (Hammer and vanBriesen, 2012). Alternative fracturing fluids and the use 
of non-fresh water are part of ongoing research activities (Pearson et al., 2012). In Canada, over 
1,200 successful simulations have taken place of what is called Dry Frac, a process that uses 
liquid CO2 as the carrier fluid in fracturing operations without using water or any additional 
treatment additives (Kargbo et al., 2010), but there are certain to be cost and logistical concerns 
of such techniques. 
 
2.2.3. Anthropogenic seismicity 
The US Geological Survey published a study that documents a seven fold increase in seismic 
activity in central US since 2008, largely associating this increase in seismic activity to the large 
increase in waste water disposal well injections (Ellsworth et al., 2012). In June 2012, the 
National Research Council published preliminary findings of an examination of scale, scope and 
consequences of induced seismicity during fluid injection and withdrawal activities related to 
amongst other shale gas extraction. The report concludes that the process of hydraulic fracturing 
does not pose a high risk for induced seismicity. In addition injection of waste water derived 
from energy technologies such as hydraulic fracturing does pose some for induced seismicity, 
but ‘very few events have been documented over the past several decades relative to the large 
number of disposal wells in operation’ (National Research Council, 2012). 
 
In April 2012, in the United Kingdom the shale gas industry received the green light to resume 
operations after research had been concluded into seismic events near Blackpool in 2011 with 
2.3 and 1.5 magnitude. Though geologists determined it was highly probable that the seismic 
events were induced operations were allowed to be resumed with the proviso that a traffic light 
system be implemented to govern operations. Should new seismic activity occur with a 
magnitude over 0.5, then operations would be suspended.5 Yet in June 2012 the Royal Society 
and the Royal Academy of Engineering published their review of scientific and engineering 
evidence regarding risks associated with hydraulic fracturing. It concludes that ‘seismic risks are 
low’ and leaves the carbon footprint of shale gas as the only contentious issue related to shale 
gas extraction on the table for further research (The Royal Society and The Royal Academy of 
Engineering, 2012). 
 
A number of industrial activities has been linked to induced seismicity, including reservoir 
impoundment, mining, construction, waste disposal, and perhaps most prominently in recent 
years, fluid injections for geothermal energy exploitation (Majer et al., 2007). The US 
Department of Energy has stated that most the induced seismic activity qualifies as an 
‘annoyance,’ not a risk, and argues that proper engineering can minimize the chances of seismic 
activity. Yet so far it is unclear where the threshold between acceptable nuisance and 
unacceptable risk is, particularly considering fracking is being done in a range of geographical 
contexts, from sparsely populated desert areas to suburban areas where an earthquake of 4.0 or 
above (of a magnitude that has been linked to fracking) could entail risks. In addition it is unclear 
whether and if so what from a regulatory perspective can be done to minimize the risks. 
 
2.3. Limiting environmental risks 
The foregoing concerns raise the obvious question of whether it is possible to limit the 
environmental risks of shale gas development. In the US, a wide variety of approaches to 
regulating shale gas and hydraulic fracturing can be pursued, from the warmest embrace of the 
technology (e.g., Texas) to outright bans (e.g., Vermont). Regulators and legislators have been 
struggling to keep up with the industry’s technological advances, as the environmental concerns 
outlined here demonstrate. Proposed regulatory interventions have been subjected to heavy 
lobbying by the gas industry, and the US Environmental Protection Agency has have also 
encountered outright hostility, such as for instance in Texas. In 2010, the Texas Commission on 
Environmental Quality (TCEQ) became the only state to refuse to implement the EPA’s 
greenhouse gas regulations, while the Texas Railroad Commission was cited for its lax 
enforcement of the Safe Drinking Water Act (Rahm, 2011). 
 
The disclosure of chemical constituents used in hydraulic fracturing fluids is still largely not 
required under federal and most state laws (Jackson et al., 2011). At first this information was 
claimed by the industry to be proprietary, but an increasing number of states has installed 
different forms of regulation, requiring companies to partially disclose what chemicals are used 
and how much of which chemicals are used. Other states are reported to be struggling with the 
exact formulation of these disclosure rules. Again, significant differences between states have 
been reported (Davis, 2012). On the federal level, water quality protection is arranged under the 
Safe Drinking Water Act. It focuses mainly on what is called “underground injection control” 
(UIC) program, regulating the subsurface emplacement of fluids. However, while hydraulic 
fracturing has been excluded from UIC regulation under a 2005 provision amending the Safe 
Drinking Water Act,6 the use of diesel fuel is not, making all hydraulic fracturing activities that 
include the usage of diesel subject to UIC regulations. Next to several states’ initiatives to 
regulate drinking water quality, the federal EPA is currently investigating the potential impacts 
of hydraulic fracturing on drinking water quality. In June 2009, the Fracturing Responsibility and 
Awareness of Chemicals Act was introduced in the US Senate and House, aiming to define 
hydraulic fracturing as a federally regulated activity under the Safe Drinking Water Act and to 
impose companies to disclose the quality and quantity of the chemicals that they use while 
exploiting shale gas, yet passage appears unlikely in the near future (Jackson et al., 2011). In 
May 2012 the US Department of the Interior published proposed rules for gas companies 
working on public and Indian lands that require the disclosure of chemicals used in hydraulic 
fracturing operations, yet only after operations have been completed (US Bureau of Land 
Management, 2012). 
 
While regulatory agencies in the United States have been in a reactive posture – and have 
struggled to keep up with industry developments – the European Union seems poised to take a 
more proactive approach in applying existing environmental legislation and formulating policies 
specific to shale gas extraction. In early 2012 the European Commission published a 
commissioned study on the existing legislative framework with regard to hydraulic fracturing 
(Philippe & Partners Law Firm, 2011). The study examined four case studies (France, Sweden, 
Germany and Poland) to assess what rules are in place in terms of licensing/permitting, including 
environmental law. The report does not assess whether all existing legislation has in fact been 
transposed into national law. The most important findings of the report, focusing in particular on 
the Polish case, can be found in Table 2. We will discuss this table in more detail in the 
subsequent section on the case of Poland. 
Table 2. Summary of rules in place in Poland regarding shale gas in terms of licencing / 
permitting and environmental law (based on Philippe and Partners Law Firm, 2011). 
Legislation Brief description Link to shale gas Relevant concerns/issues 
Hydrocarbons 
Directive 94/22/EC 
General principles for 
granting and authorizing 
exploration and production 
of hydrocarbons. 
Basic legislation regarding 
hydrocarbons extraction in 
the European Union. 
Member States have 
sovereign rights over their 
resources. 
– 
In Poland mining usufruct 
with State Treasury is 
required next to relevant 
permits 
Environmental Impact 
Assessment Directive 
2011/92/EU 
Procedure to ensure that 
projects that are likely to 
have significant effects on 
the environment are subject 
to an assessment, prior to 
approval. 
Overall environmental 
impacts form basis of 
ongoing academic 
disputes, regarding 
drinking water, methane 
emissions and seismic 
activity. 
– 
EIA is not mandatory, only 
subject to so-called Annex II 
projects 
– 
Polish Environment Ministry 
states that generally deep 
drilling methods require an 
EIA 
Water Framework 
Directive 2000/60/EC, 
Ground Water 
Directive 2006/118/EC 
and Urban Waste 
Water Treatment 
Directive 91/271/EEC 
These directives all aim to 
contribute to water 
protection in the Member 
States, transposed in Poland 
in the Water Law Act and 
the Environment Protection 
Act. 
One of the contested areas 
of environmental impact of 
hydraulic fracturing and 
related activities. 
– 
In Poland, there are no 
specific requirements 
regarding the prevention of 
contamination of ground and 
surface water 
Mining Waste 
Directive 2006/21/EC 
Waste from extractive 
industries requires prior 
permitting. 
Links predominantly to the 
disposal of waste water 
after fracking has occurred 
– 
While the more general Waste 
Directive 2008/98/EC may 
apply, but has not yet been 
transposed in Poland. 
Directives related to 
the Emissions Trading 
Scheme (2009/29/EC 
and others) and 
Atmospheric Pollutant 
Directive 2001/81/EC 
Legislation safeguarding air 
quality and monitoring a 
wide range of emissions, 
including carbon, methane, 
nitrogen oxides, volatile 
organic compounds and 
sulfur dioxide. 
Methane leakage forms 
one of the most prominent 
disputes in academia, 
influencing the overall 
carbon footprint of shale 
gas (that proponents see as 
a bridging fuel). 
– 
In case of exceeding the 
national emissions ceiling, the 
relevant authorities have to 
make a plan how to limit or 
revoke emission permits. 
Environment 
Protection Act and the 
Soil protection is a 
jurisdiction of the member 
Certain land areas may be 
designated for other 
– 
Legislation Brief description Link to shale gas Relevant concerns/issues 
Act on Protection of 
Agricultural and Forest 
Land. 
States, in Poland arranged 
through two laws. No 
specific permits relate to 
soil protection. 
purposes than resource 
extraction 
For shale gas extraction, it 
may be necessary to change 
the use of land as defined in 
so-called ‘land development 
plans’. 
Habitat Directive 
92/43/EEC and the 
Wild Bird Directive 
2009/147/EC 
Directives form the 
cornerstone of European 
nature conservation policy, 
linked to the Natura 2000 
network of protected sites. 
With many protected 
nature conservation areas 
in Poland, regulation 
following from these 
Directives can apply to 
envisaged shale gas 
extraction sites. 
– 
Activities in protected areas 
require prior assessment. In 
Poland projects could still be 
authorized ‘for imperative 
reasons overriding public 
interest only’. Unclear 
whether and if so how this 
linked to shale gas extraction. 
Noise legislation, i.e., 
2009/42/EC and 
2000/14/EC 
Activities related to shale 
gas are submitted to noise 
limitations. In Poland, 
hydrocarbon related 
activities fall in the scope of 
existing regulation. 
As all industrial activity, 
shale gas extraction is 
submitted to noise 
limitations. This is 
expected to apply mostly 
to the drilling phase. 
– 
Outdoor equipment noise 
standards are set not by the 
Ministry of the Environment 
but their colleagues on 
Economy. 
Existing legislation 
with respect to the 
transport of chemicals 
2008/68/EC and their 
registration 
2006/1907/EC 
(REACH) 
Legislation aims to regulate 
safe transport of dangerous 
good in the Member States. 
REACH regulates 
chemicals and their safe 
usage, dealing with 
registration, evaluation, 
authorization and restriction 
of chemicals. 
Chemicals are a very small 
but crucial element of the 
fracking fluids used when 
extracting shale gas. 
Amongst others, chemical 
substances have been 
added to prevent corrosion 
or enhance viscosity. 
– 
Implementation of directive 
on inland transport of 
dangerous goods has not been 
carried out in Poland. 
– 
No specific disclosure 
procedure on hydraulic 
fracturing fluids is currently 
in place in Poland. Relevant 
authorities may however 
require disclosure. 
– 
Operators seem to fall under 
REACH, yet is it not clear 
whether used chemicals meet 
relevant thresholds 
 
 
In September 2012 the European Commission published three sizeable reports about the impacts 
of shale gas on markets, environment and climate (AEA, 2012a, AEA, 2012b and Pearson et al., 
2012). The report on the environmental impacts of shale gas extraction concludes that shale gas 
extraction generally imposes a larger environmental footprint than conventional gas extraction 
(AEA, 2012b). It identifies environmental pressures in terms of land use, releases to air, noise 
pollution, surface and groundwater contamination, water resources, biodiversity impacts, traffic, 
visual impact and seismicity. Currently, nineteen pieces of European Union legislation are 
relevant to all or some of the stages of shale gas extraction. The study on climate impacts suggest 
that greenhouse gas emissions from shale gas generation are 2% to 10% lower than emissions 
from electricity generated from sources of conventional pipeline gas located outside of Europe, 
and 7% to 10% lower than that of electricity generated from LNG (AEA, 2012a). However, these 
results are entirely contingent upon effective control of emissions during the production phase 
(‘venting’). Questions remain as to what regulation would be appropriate to regulate emissions 
from shale gas extraction. The authors name the Environmental Impact Directive, the Directive 
on Industrial Emissions and the European Emissions Trading Scheme as possible vehicles. 
 
3. Policy implications for Poland 
Not a single molecule of shale gas has been produced in Poland, and many questions remain 
whether shale gas will actually be produced commercially in the future. Yet this has not stopped 
“shale gas euphoria” in Poland (Wyciszkiewicz et al., 2011), nor has it prevented active 
opposition to fracking in Brussels and elsewhere. The reasons for enthusiasm in Poland are 
numerous, but at the top of the list are concerns over (a) the high prices consumers pay for gas in 
Poland, and (from a producer’s perspective) the high rents that could be charged for domestically 
produced gas, and (b) a deep-held and widespread belief that the country is overly beholden to an 
undependable and unpredictable supplier, that being Russia. This latter concern about what is 
widely referred to as “energy security,” will be covered in a subsequent section. 
 
3.1. Background on shale gas in Poland 
Polish geologists have long known about the organically rich shale deposits stretching from the 
Baltic Sea southeasterly to the border with Ukraine. The technological innovations that led to the 
shale gas revolution in North America, however, opened up the prospect that these hitherto 
untapped reserves could be commercially exploited. The three basins in question, where there is 
potential for commercial exploitation, are: the Baltic Basin (northern), Podlasie Basin (east and 
east-central), and Lublin (southeast) (US Energy Information Administration, 2011). Poland is 
not new to natural gas production, but development of conventional oil and gas deposits in the 
past had mainly been in the southern Carpathian region (US Energy Information Administration, 
2011) and was limited in international comparison. In 2010, Poland’s production of 215 bcf of 
natural gas was about 2% of the European total production. By contrast, Poland has long been a 
large producer and consumer of coal. In 2010, it produced 146 million short tons of coal, or 
about 20% of European production (US Energy Information Administration, 2012). 
 
This rather modest history of natural gas production, then, made the estimates of the US EIA all 
the more sensational when they came out in April 2011. The US EIA had estimated that 
technically recoverable shale gas resources are roughly 187 tcf (5300 bcm), or nearly 900 times 
Poland’s 2010 consumption of gas. Less than a year later, the Polish Geological Institute released 
a preliminary assessment that was much more modest, estimating 1920 bcm of shale gas, of 
which somewhere between 350 bcm and 770 bcm is likely recoverable (Polish Geological 
Institute, 2012). It is important to note that since not a single molecule of gas has been obtained 
from the exploratory wells, these figures represent statistical probabilities based on the known 
stratigraphy of the regions in question. The US EIA estimates put Poland’s shale gas resources as 
the largest in the EU, with other substantial basins located in France (with over 150 tcf of 
technically recoverable shale gas spread out over the country) and Scandinavia (with comparable 
figures) (US Energy Information Administration, 2011). 
 
As of April 2012, seventeen wells have been drilled, two of them horizontal, with several drilling 
operations underway (Talisman Energy, ENI). The two horizontal wells and a handful of vertical 
wells had been hydraulically fractured. Cores of shale rock are currently in the hands of 
geochemists in laboratories in the USA and Canada. Industry officials have told us that the 
preliminary findings are “very promising,” but there have also been indications from 3 Legs and 
BNK Petroleum that wells drilled in Poland underperformed expectations.7 In June of 2012 
Exxon Mobil even decided to end shale gas tests in Poland. All this indicates the embryonic state 
in which the Polish shale gas sector currently is, though Polish policy makers would love to 
believe otherwise. Another example is the underdeveloped gas and oil service industry that is 
present in Poland with only two hands full of drilling rigs. Moreover, there is no clear indication 
yet whether the economic and political conditions in Poland will be favorable enough for 
industry players to justify further exploitation of this resource. While all policy makers in 
Warsaw we talked to are highly in favor of developing Polish shale gas reserves as soon as 
possible, there are substantial hurdles to be overcome, as we will see in the following sections. 
 
3.2. Infrastructural limitations 
Poland could be typified as gas country under construction. Traditionally the share of natural gas 
has been limited, with a yearly domestic consumption of around 14 bcm, forming roughly 13% 
of its primary energy consumption. Of this gas one third is produced domestically, while the rest 
is imported, exclusively from Russia. Given the limited role of natural gas in the Polish energy 
mix, it is no surprise that infrastructure is not substantially developed. To give an example, only 
54.6% of households currently has access to the gas network (Central Statistical Office (Poland), 
2012). Most pipelines are located in the south west of the country, where industry is clustered, 
and around the main urban areas, but not necessarily in the areas where shale gas would be 
produced. Furthermore large transit pipelines have been built across the country from east to 
west. 
 
With the emergence of shale gas reserves and continued high dependence of Russian gas 
imports, increased investments in Polish gas infrastructure can be identified. The demand 
forecasts used by the national transmission system operator, called Gaz-System, show that 
maximum gas demand in Poland is expected to double within this decade, to as estimated 30 
bcm in 2021. First, Gaz-System is investing in interconnection capacity to get the Polish gas 
market out of its isolation and connect it to neighboring countries to its west and south. The 
existing interconnector with Germany in Lasów has been upgraded to a maximum capacity of 
1.5 bcm starting January 2012. To the south an interconnector has been launched in September 
2011 on the border with Czech Republic at Cieszyn with a capacity of 0.5 bcm, albeit not yet 
two-directional. These investments are part of the Transmission System Development Program 
for 2010–2014 in which 1000 km of new pipeline are envisaged. 
 
Next to these commissioned projects, several interconnections are under study. In January 2012, 
Gaz System and its Lithuanian counterpart Lietuvos started a feasibility study on an 
interconnector between the two countries. In 2013, Gaz System and Eustream are expected to 
present their findings regarding an interconnector between Poland and Slovakia. Later this year 
both existing interconnectors with Germany and Czech Republic may receive green lights for 
further upgrade as well. Both these projects were substantially financed through the European 
Energy Program for Recovery (European Union, 2010), i.e., € 10.5 million for the Czech 
interconnector and € 14.5 million for the German interconnector. 
 
Next to these infrastructural projects that are intended to reshape the Polish gas market and 
connect it to the European Union, there are several developments that could contribute to further 
diversification of gas supplies in Poland. Currently the most tangible project is an LNG terminal 
that is constructed in Świnoujście in the north west of the country. Its maximum capacity is 5 
bcm at a cost of € 700 million, of which roughly half is financed by the European Commission 
(Polish News Bulletin, 2011). In addition the European Investment Bank has loaned Poland 
approximately € 135 million to realize this project (European Investment Bank, 2011). 
 
Furthermore the so-called Baltic Pipe is in its pre-construction phase, eventually aiming to link 
Poland and Denmark. It is intended to give Poland access to Norwegian gas, while the Danish 
have expressed interest in receiving Russian gas from Poland. The European Commission 
envisages investing € 150 million in this pipeline (European Commission, 2009). 
 
And then there might be shale gas. The verdict of private companies is out regarding the 
potential future development of the reserves. The lack of sufficient infrastructure is certainly one 
consideration potential investors are considering in light of the geographical location of shale 
resources stretching in a band from around Gdańsk to the Ukrainian border in the south east. 
Additional investments in infrastructure may be necessary to ship large amounts of shale gas, 
either domestically or internationally. Even without those additional investments, ongoing 
infrastructural projects may well occupy at least the first part of this decade. With substantial 
new supplies coming online from then onward – with for instance the commissioning of the 
LNG terminal in Świnoujście – the pressure is on for Polish transmission system operators and 
policy makers to prepare its domestic market for either gas consumption or significant gas 
imports and exports. 
 
3.3. Regulatory hurdles 
Next to infrastructural challenges, Poland also has regulatory hurdles to overcome. A report 
commissioned by the European Commission in January 2012 seemed to buoy Polish ambitions, 
as it concluded that the regulatory framework was appropriate for the current state of exploration 
of shale gas in the four countries under study, including Poland (Philippe & Partners Law Firm, 
2011). The study did not, however, provide any guidance in terms of under what conditions 
commercial-scale development would occur. As Table 2 demonstrates, under current 
circumstances the Polish authorities have not fully implemented all existing European guidelines 
related to shale gas, e.g., the Waste Directive or the Directive on inland transport of dangerous 
goods. Furthermore, several issues are not part of the regulatory framework but, referring to 
current debates in the United States, would deserve attention in case of commercial exploitation 
of shale gas. The most obvious examples of this are the lack of specific requirements regarding 
the prevention of contamination of ground and surface water or the absence of specific disclosure 
procedures on hydraulic fracturing fluids. Needless to say, these elements are not in place 
anywhere in the European Union at this stage, but they seem valuable lessons learned for Poland 
to become a responsible front runner in shale gas extraction. 
 
Next to environmental and procedural regulations, Poland will have to meet the obligations as 
laid down in the European legislation for the internal market of gas (European Union, 2009). 
Though theoretically the Polish market is open to competition since 2007, some serious obstacles 
remain. State-owned incumbent company PGNiG represents 97.5% of gas sales in the country 
and is also responsible for all distribution networks in the country. Therefore short term 
competition in the market is difficult to envisage. It remains to be seen when natural gas price 
regulation will be abandoned, but this is not expected before 2013. 
 
So what can the European Commission do when regulations have not been implemented? 
Formally, under the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union, the Commission guards 
over proper implementation of European law in the Member States and can start infringement 
proceedings in case of non-compliance. Ultimately the Commission may also refer the case to 
the European Court of Justice. History has shown that the Commission sometimes struggles to 
compel Member States to implement European law, despite its formal powers to do so. These 
cases mostly involve non-compliance of large Member States or non-compliance of a large 
number of Member States. Examples are the partial implementation of unbundling regulations by 
France and Germany or the delayed implementation of biofuels regulations in almost all Member 
States. Regarding shale gas however, it seems that Poland is increasingly becoming isolated, in 
that its officials are practically alone in Brussels advocating of shale gas exploitation, while 
representatives of other Member States are either silent or are simply opposing. Therefore, 
despite its importance in Brussels, the European Commission is expected to have substantial 
leverage to motivate Poland to implement relevant legislation promptly. 
 
4. Energy (in)security and the geopolitics equation 
When energy becomes an instrument, or even weapon, it stops being an economic issue and 
becomes a matter of national security,” … [it cannot] “simply be resolved by pressing several 
free-market buttons labeled ‘liberalization,’ ‘competition,’ etc.” (Radek Sikorski 7 May 2008, 
quoted in Roth, 2011). 
 
While industry balances economic with geologic realities in assessing the potentials for shale gas 
development in Poland, our interviews with government officials in Poland revealed an even 
more pressing agenda impacting their interest in shale gas: energy security. Traditionally, energy 
security policy agendas have been rooted in a merger of national security and energy supplies, 
and are based on the assumption that a core function of a state’s domestic and foreign policy is to 
ensure access to reliable and affordable energy sources. As is well-documented (see, e.g., 
Yergin, 2006), however, the definition of energy security is highly context-dependent. While the 
US experience – and nearly forty years of government policy – is still influenced by the oil 
embargoes of the 1970s, current EU policy focuses on stability, affordability, and sustainability 
(European Union, 2007). For the purposes of this paper, we are less interested in putting forth 
our own interpretation of energy security than in presenting how this essentially contested term 
frames the debate over shale gas in Poland and the EU. 
 
Poland’s energy security agenda is colored by profound distrust of Russia, and even of Poland’s 
fellow EU member states, on questions of energy resources. This is perhaps not surprising, given 
the history of war, subjugation, hegemony, and mistrust in this part of Europe, historically often 
under the yoke of Russia and Germany. But alongside the tragedies of history is a seemingly 
unacknowledged reality that Russian companies have been stable suppliers of both natural gas 
and crude oil to Poland for many decades. During the oft-cited price dispute between Russia and 
Ukraine in January 2009, which caused supply interruptions to European consumers and caused 
some in Southeastern Europe to actually go without gas for several days, Gazprom actually 
increased shipments substantially to Europe via the Yamal pipeline (which traverses Belarus and 
Poland), so that consumers in Poland and Germany did not feel the interruption (Le Coq and 
Paltseva, 2012). 
 
Energy security has special meaning for Poland (“geopolitical vulnerability”). Energy policy 
discourse in Poland exhibits a high degree of “securitization,” meaning that the topic of energy is 
often framed in terms of national security and an existential threat (Roth, 2011). The security 
aspects of the current shale gas discussions in Poland are noteworthy, and the securitization of 
the debate stands in contrast to energy discussions in other parts of Europe. This is in contrast to 
other EU member states, e.g., Germany, which has traditionally treated energy as primarily 
economic considerations not strategic ones, and has viewed Russia as basically adhering to 
market norms (Umbach, 2010). Since joining the European Union in 2004, Poland has been a 
strong voice in bringing energy to the fore of discussions of European external relations amid 
widespread perceptions in Central and Eastern Europe that energy policy in the EU prior to the 
2004 enlargement had not sufficiently addressed Europe’s overdependence on energy imports 
(Roth, 2011). While Poland’s efforts to create an “energy NATO” in the EU, whereby supply 
threats to one member state constituted a threat to every member (the “Musketeer” principle) 
were ultimately not successful, it was largely Polish efforts that led to “energy solidarity” 
language being inserted into the Lisbon Treaty and Poland has very actively pursued additional 
funding for new energy infrastructure (Roth, 2011), the latter for obvious reasons as we will 
argue later. While the securitization of shale gas in certain circles of the Polish elite is perhaps 
understandable, it is also very likely counterproductive given the actual administrative and 
legislative hurdles that could impede the development of this resource. 
 
Dependency on Russia has been a heated topic of discussion in the EU, and Poland in particular. 
Some have even speculated that the development of unconventional gas resources in Europe is 
enabled by the unpredictability of Russian supplies (Kuhn and Umbach, 2011). The recent 
inauguration of the Nord Stream pipeline linking Russia and Germany beneath the Baltic Sea 
represents a strategy by both governments, Gazprom, and western European utilities to reduce 
transit risk by bypassing intermediary countries such as Ukraine and Belarus. The reaction in 
Poland to the Nord Stream fairly predictably was negative, since it was also bypassed by the 
pipeline, thought that was likely coincidental. This did not prevent some observers from recalling 
the past, with some calling Nord Stream the “Molotov–Ribbentrop pipeline,” (Le Coq and 
Paltseva, 2012)—the now foreign minister (then defense minister) Radek Sikorski made allusion 
to the Nazi–Soviet non-aggression pact in 2006 (Roth, 2011). Since the inauguration of the Nord 
Stream pipeline, there has been a great fear in Poland that Russia would be in a better position to 
use gas as a political blunt instrument. 
 
Amid the widespread speculation and conspiracy theories surrounding Russia and framing the 
need to develop local shale gas resources as a hedge against external threats to Poland’s energy 
security, there are a few things worth noting. Several assessments of the risk to EU gas supply 
have highlighted the lack of interconnectivity within the EU, and not Russian aggression, as 
being the main transit risk (Le Coq and Paltseva, 2012 and Noël, 2009). Contrary to a commonly 
held view, transit risk did not increase in the period 1998–2008 (Le Coq and Paltseva, 2012). 
While the Kremlin has obviously used its energy export capabilities as a short-term leveraging 
tool in the past, historical examples of this underscore the point made by Larsson (2006) that 
supply interruptions targeted at Poland or another EU member state are highly unlikely, as are 
long-term cutoffs that would impact Poland or another EU member state for an extended period 
of time. Moreover, more often than not Russia failed to achieve the political concessions it 
sought with supply disruptions (Smith Stegen, 2011). 
 
Even if Russia were to use its gas as a political instrument in the future, without significant 
investment in new conventional gas fields such as Yamal or Shtokman, it is unclear whether 
Russia is in a position to meet future demand both domestic and abroad (Söderbergh et al., 
2010). Several officials in Poland pointed off the record to German and French governments as 
having anti-shale agendas, whether rooted in the alleged desire of Germany to increase exports 
of renewable energy technologies, or in France’s powerful nuclear interests. While there is not 
much evidence for anti-shale conspiracies in other member states, Polish policy makers seem 
committed to toe a line between engaging other European member states and European 
institutions regarding this topic, while maintaining rhetorically that exploitation of domestic 
energy resources has traditionally been treated as the purview of individual member states. Up to 
date it is unclear why that would not be the case with shale gas. Our interviews with policy 
makers in Brussels also suggest that the Polish authorities are encouraged to make their own 
decisions regarding the extraction of their natural resources, within the regulatory framework 
that is currently in place. 
 
While the securitization of shale gas in certain circles of the Polish elite is perhaps 
understandable, it is also very likely counterproductive given the actual administrative and 
legislative hurdles that could impede the development of this resource. Moreover, in lack of 
coordination, Polish efforts to excite other member states for future shale gas extraction have 
appeared rather opportunistic. Just before the country took over the six-months presidency of the 
European Union it suggested that shale gas extraction should be a project of common European 
interest, while six months later this position had shifted (Wyciszkiewicz et al., 2011). It is worth 
noting that over the summer France had decided to ban hydraulic fracturing, while other member 
states had announced further research into environmental concerns. After the French ban, the 
European Commission reiterated that it ‘remains neutral’ as regards member states decisions 
concerning their energy mix.8 
 
Polish officials often argue that Poland’s dependence on Russian gas supplies is risky. Even if 
Russia were not a dependable supplier – which is questionable as just shown – it remains unclear 
why that would be a problem for a country that uses almost exclusively oil and coal as primary 
energy resources. One possible scenario is that current attempts by the Polish transmission 
system operator Gaz-System, Polish government officials, and others involved in the 
development of the Polish gas market will in fact lead to increased future dependence on Russia. 
Even when assumed that Polish shale gas will be extracted at some point, the most recent 
geologic forecasts demonstrate that there will only be sufficient supplies to cover a few decades 
at present rates of use assuming domestic gas were substituted for imports. Thus, at some point 
as hypothetical shale gas runs its course in the Poland’s energy mix, price will dictate what shall 
replace it in that pipeline infrastructure, which means likely either LNG or Russian gas. 
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper has provided an overview of the geologic, economic, environmental and political-
regulatory issues related to shale gas and hydraulic fracturing, and it has used the case of Poland 
to examine the prospects for a nascent shale gas industry in that country. While certain market 
conditions are certainly ripe for additional supplies of natural gas coming on stream in this part 
of Europe, high consumer prices and dependence on a small number of suppliers are by 
themselves not sufficient to ensure that this resource is developed in the future. Geological 
realities, coupled with infrastructural limitations, valid environmental concerns, and regulatory 
uncertainties, pose significant hurdles to shale gas development in Poland. In short, it is far from 
certain whether the obstacles facing industry and policy makers will be overcome. What stands 
out in the Polish case is that even under favorable geologic and market conditions, there are 
substantial infrastructural, political and regulatory hurdles to be overcome. At least part of the 
key to shale gas development therefore seems to lie in the halls of government of Warsaw. 
 
While this paper has assessed some of the larger-scale issues in the economic and political 
environments in Poland, the European Union, and beyond, we were not in a position to assess 
local challenges to shale gas development. North Americans, at least those in places such as 
Texas, Oklahoma, and Alberta, are largely accustomed to hydrocarbon extraction and the 
resulting disturbances to the landscape, noise pollution, in combination with substantial royalty 
checks (at least in the US), but the same cannot be said of those living in the regions where shale 
gas development would likely take place in Poland. Public opposition there has so far been 
barely visible, but so has the extent of exploratory drilling. The lack of public opposition is likely 
related to a combination of factors, including the historical tensions and mistrust between Poland 
and Russia, but it is too early to assess to what extent the Polish public would welcome large 
scale shale gas development. 
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